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Abstract
Information technology (IT) security certifications have proliferated in recent years. However they differ in
regards to stakeholder considerations of credibility, accessibility and relevance. Key stakeholders with an
interest in selecting an IT security certification (IT security professionals, employers, governments and higher
education institutes) lack a systematic approach for differentiating between candidate certifications and
selecting the “best” certification to satisfy requirements. The paper focuses on reporting a confirmatory focus
group from a recent research project. It provides a framework for supporting stakeholder evaluation and
selection of IT security certifications and discusses key implications for the IT security industry, IT security
certifications, and the higher education sector.
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INTRODUCTION
Globally, and locally in Australia, there is an increasing organisational demand for skilled IT security
professionals (Margolis 2008; Rossi 2007). An information technology (IT) security certification (hereon termed
“security certification”) is viewed by employers, governments and educators as an important qualification for IT
security professionals (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2007; Hentea et al 2006; Vijayan 2007; Whitney 2007). This
perception is also held in the local Australian context (where the study reported in this paper is located), as
evidenced by the recent recognition of at least one security certification, CISSP, as part of the Federal
government’s migration process. In a recent global survey, 36 percent of employers were sending IT
professionals to security certification courses to address the IT security skills shortage (Margolis, 2008). Indeed,
IT security certifications are one of the few types of IT certification currently in demand (Marsan, 2007). Yet
there are hundreds of security certifications available, presenting a challenge for IT security professionals,
employers, higher education (HE) institute course developers and government agencies attempting to select the
“best” security certification scheme to meet situational and individual requirements.
Recently experts have called for a single international IT security certification tied to a planned IT security
Common Body of Knowledge (CBK) (e.g. Nance & Hay, 2007). Such a certification would replace the current
proliferation of security certifications. However so far there has been little support for such consolidation,
possibly due to the competitive value of the schemes for developers, ongoing competition between certification
bodies, and diverse target markets for certifications; hence, new security certifications continue to appear (e.g.
Sosunovas & Vasilecas 2007).
In this increasingly complex setting, how do IT security professionals and other stakeholders select a security
certification that meets their special needs and context, from the current range available? Currently there is a
lack of systematic approaches for selecting the “best” security certification. By September 2006, there were
around 100 vendor-neutral security certifications and around 40 vendor-specific security certifications (Tittel &
Lindros, 2006) suggesting that selecting the “best” certification is an onerous and ad hoc undertaking. Existing
approaches to security certification evaluation are neither rigorous, systematic nor complete, and have often
been constructed from a North American perspective. Some approaches allow comparisons of the skills and
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curriculum scope (e.g. SIFT 2008). However more generally, approaches do not consider wider and unique
stakeholder needs in regards to certification credibility, accessibility and relevance.
This paper provides key findings from the final phase of a research project - a confirmatory focus group - and
reports 1) a service-oriented framework for supporting stakeholder evaluation of IT security certifications, 2) a
discussion of key stakeholder considerations, and 3) practical implications for the IT security industry, security
certification developers and HE institutes. The framework is intended to support five key stakeholder groups –
potential and experienced IT security professionals, employers, HE institutes and governments. It aims to
provide services which assist a stakeholder in understanding and ranking the relative merits and positioning of
each certification, thereby supporting certification selection.
The paper proceeds by providing a theoretical background developed from a review of relevant literature. Next,
the research design is outlined. The paper then presents its key findings and concludes with a summary of key
theoretical and practical implications.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Key Stakeholders in IT Security Certification Evaluation and Selection
Four key stakeholder groups have a special interest in security certifications and selection of the “best” one.
First, IT security professionals are interested in holding the “best” security certification for the purposes of
employment, expertise development and increased remuneration (SIFT, 2008). Ott observed, referring to the
different bodies that offer IT security certification, that “each of these organizations wants to be the premier
independent certification, but how does an information security professional determine which one provides
value-added credentials?” (Ott 2001, p2).
Second, a systematic IT security certification evaluation approach may assist HE institutes aiming to develop IT
security courses that equip students for careers as IT security professionals. Experts recently argued for a role for
IT security certification in HE information security courses (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2007). Yang (2001,
pp237-238), in examining the impact of information security on computer science education, selected four
programmes and attempted to identify common themes. However neither the range of schemes considered, nor
the depth of analysis, would sufficiently inform a course designer about which scheme would be most
appropriate to include in a particular degree. Meanwhile IT security course curricula are being standardised
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003) without the benefit of knowledge of key differences and merits of various security
certifications.
Third, employers seek IT security professionals with the most relevant security certifications. Many employers
use security certifications during recruitment as a filter (Gross, 2003). Lainhart notes that employers are “relying
on [IT security] certifications to identify prospective employees with experience and expertise” (Lainhart, 2008).
As candidates may possess certifications from many different bodies, a security certification evaluation model
would allow them to effectively compare a range of certification schemes with the requirements of their
organisation. Lainhart also remarks that, particularly in the United States, holding the “right” certification has
become especially important for organisations due to Sarbanes-Oxley regulation and increased security scrutiny
worldwide.
Finally, a systematic approach to security certification evaluation could be useful to governments seeking to
determine the relevance of particular qualifications for accelerated immigration purposes or for the purpose of
regulating the IT security profession.
Categories, Characteristics and Criteria for Evaluating IT Security Certification Schemes
In the research project a security certification evaluation model was developed (as will be described in the
Research Design section) which supports a systematic comparison of a set of IT security certifications. Eleven
characteristics, grouped into three major categories, underpin the evaluation model (summarised in Table 1).
The characteristics and categories were originally developed from a literature review and refined and extended
during the project. Each characteristic has one or more evaluation criteria (summarised in Table 1) which are
weighted by individual stakeholders and used during application of the model to assess the merits of each
security certification. Further details of the categories, characteristics and evaluation criteria - and the
application of the model to support certification evaluation, ranking and selection - can be found in Tate et al
(2007b).
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Table 1. IT Security Certification Evaluation Model:
Categories, Characteristics and Evaluation Criteria
CATEGORY
CREDIBILITY

CHARACTERISTIC
Governance

Assessment

Curriculum Definition

ACCESSIBILITY

Access Restrictions

Cost
National Restrictions

RELEVANCE

Vendor Neutrality
Academic
Credentials and
Experience
Ethical Code

Market Acceptance
Localisation

EVALUATION CRITERIA ( CS = Certification Scheme)
- With which governance standards does the CS conform? (e.g. ISO
standard 17024?)
- Does the CS have a governing Board?
- Is the CS independent of a training provider which may benefit from it
commercially or otherwise?
- Are the profits from the CS re-invested in it?
- Is the CS able to operate without direct or indirect government control?
- Does the governing board of the CS have members from more than one
country?
- Is the governing board of the CS able to act independently of the
scheme owner?
- Does the CS use an open examination as a means of assessment?
- If an examination is used, what are its characteristics?
- What other assessment is undertaken?
- Is the CS based on a recognised body of knowledge which is published
and publicly available?
- Is the body of knowledge based on applicable standards such as those
from ISO?
- Is there a clear process for reviewing and updating the body of
knowledge on a regular basis?
- How often must candidates submit for re-certification?
- Can the CS be obtained without a required training course from the
offering body?
- Does the CS require a mandatory training course?
- What is the cost of attaining certification?
- What is the cost of retaining certification?
- Are there any restrictions on access to the CS, based on nationality?
- If training is mandatory before applying for certification, are there
restrictions on access to the training, based on nationality?
- Is the CS run by a vendor to provide certification for its products?
- Is a degree, or equivalent, an entry requirement for the CS?
- How many years of information security work experience is required
for the CS?
- How is information security work experience verified?
- Does the CS have a professional code of ethics which all students who
seek certification, must accept?
- Have there been any cases where the ethical code has been enforced?
- How many holders of certification from this CS are declared?
- Does the CS allow for local variation by jurisdiction?
- Does the cost of the CS vary by country?
- How many localised variants of the CS are available?
- In what languages is the CS available?
- In what countries is the CS offered?

Next we review existing literature supporting the inclusion of the Credibility, Accessibility and Relevance
categories and related characteristics for evaluating security certifications, in the evaluation model. For a
certification to be considered acceptable by a stakeholder it must first be perceived as credible. As Facklam
(2002, p32) suggests, “Confidence in the respective certification schemes is achieved by means of a globally
accepted process of assessment, subsequent surveillance and periodic re-assessments of the competence of
certified persons”. Three key characteristics of credibility are: governance, assessment and curriculum
definition.
First, if the governance of an organisation that offers a particular security certification is not open and
transparent – with few, if any, conflicts of interest – we argue that the scheme lacks credibility. In addition, if
governance is not seen to guarantee certification independence from commercial, government or national
interests, the scheme also lacks credibility. The importance of certification governance is illustrated by the
proportion of the ISO/IEC 17024:2003 standard (ISO, 2003) devoted to the rules for scheme governing bodies.
The US Department of Defence requires its personnel to have information assurance certification that is
accredited by this standard (McNulty, 2005). Second, the credibility of a certification scheme is linked to its
assessment. Schultz (2005) suggests that many schemes are too simplistic in their assessment requirements.
Third, the IT security curriculum definition represents the body of IT security knowledge offered and is
therefore an important credibility characteristic (Hentea, & Dhillon, 2006; Schultz, 2005). In particular, the
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curriculum definition should include discussion and assessment of technological, legal and ethical aspects of IT
security (Endicott-Popovsky, 2003). It should be current and based on relevant international standards. It is also
argued that if the curriculum is so narrowly defined as to be only applicable to people who live in Connecticut
and can configure a particular router, how credible could it be? On the other hand, if a security certification has
a curriculum that is so broadly defined that 95 percent of the world’s population could pass it after reading a
magazine article, the certification clearly lacks credibility.
The accessibility of a scheme is important for egalitarian reasons (Bledsoe & Graham 2005). Three key
characteristics of accessibility are: access restrictions, cost and national restrictions. First, in respect of access
restrictions, an open certification scheme enables individuals to demonstrate their IT security capabilities,
irrespective of training. Access restrictions exist when it is mandatory that a candidate for certification
examination first undertake a particular training course, thereby increasing costs and imposing additional
constraints. Second, stakeholder selection of a certification scheme is likely to be linked to the financial cost of
access. In the case of international schemes, the notion of affordability varies by economy. It is suggested that a
scheme which does not account for such variability is likely to limit user access to the scheme. Third, as
cybersecurity becomes increasingly linked to national security, national restrictions may apply to the selection
of candidates for IT security courses. Frincke (2003) observes that “Many security programs already segregate
their audiences to a certain extent, for certain material … Some US agencies limit participation to those with US
citizenship”. Is it feasible to have a global IT Security certification scheme if selected aspects are limited to
citizens of a particular country?
Certifications should be relevant to stakeholders. Five key characteristics of relevance are: vendor neutrality,
academic credentials and experience, ethical code, market acceptance and localisation. First, regarding vendor
neutrality, there are vendor-specific certifications which certify that the certification holder has knowledge of a
vendor product and related skill sets. There are also vendor-neutral schemes which certify broad knowledge of a
particular domain, that are generally run by an industry or “not-for-profit” group. Some of these schemes offer a
range of certifications focusing on specialised skill sets – for example, GIAC (Pike, 2008). Second, regarding
academic credentials and experience, key questions about a certification scheme are “What are its objectives?”
and “How does the scheme relate to an academic degree in IT security?” Experts suggest that vendor-neutral
certification is complementary to, and an extension of, a degree in IT security by generally requiring a degree, a
level of experience and some specific knowledge of professional practice in IT security, which would not
normally be included in a degree. On the other hand, vendor-specific certification focuses on skills training for
particular products. Third, with IT security, a code of ethics can assume particular importance since the
knowledge needed to defend systems and networks against attack is the same knowledge that could be used to
attack them (Logan & Clarkson 2005). The need for a code of ethics appears to be met by vendor-neutral
certification schemes that mandate agreement to their code. Fourth, if a scheme does not gain market acceptance
from employers and governments, the scheme will become irrelevant (Claburn 2006). Fifth, if a scheme does not
account for local variations in law, culture, regulation and market development it is unlikely to be relevant to the
jurisdiction where it operates. It is noted that a number of certifications originate in the USA and in some cases
their curriculum is based on US legal practice rather than international needs.

RESEARCH DESIGN
A research project was conceived to identify an approach for the systematic evaluation and selection of an IT
security certification scheme for each of the four key stakeholder types (IT security professional, employer,
government and HE institute). As the environment for IT security certification evaluation involves people, an
interpretive research approach was adopted (Walsham 1995). The success or failure of an IT security
certification evaluation is dependent on those who conduct the evaluation. We investigated the perceptions and
experiences of the key stakeholder types in a four phase study.
In Phase One, a literature review was conducted to provide a theoretical background and establish research
questions. The literature review also revealed only piecemeal approaches to the evaluation and selection of
security certifications; these approaches did not systematically consider stakeholder requirements and
preferences, and did not meet key objectives for such an approach (Tate et al, 2007a). Next, as discussed above,
scholarly, professional and popular literatures in the information security domain were reviewed and synthesised
to develop key categories and characteristics for a draft evaluation model.
In Phase Two, the draft evaluation model was explored by a two hour focus group session at the AusCERT2006
conference held on the Gold Coast, Australia, in May 2006. The focus group participants comprised seven
senior IT security representatives from industry, HE institutes and national government agencies. Two
participants are international experts in information security. Three participants are IT security professionals at
Australian and New Zealand Universities. The sixth participant is an IT security specialist with a government
department, and the remaining participant is the director of IT Security engineering for a major IT vendor. The
session was moderated by a senior Australian academic in information security. The focus group session debated
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significant issues relating to the draft model. Notes and a session transcript were analysed for key themes using
successive iterations of inductive qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000). Findings supported the draft
model and also suggested several enhancements. The researcher also further explored the themes that suggested
criteria for assessing the framework’s characteristics, by a literature review and an examination of ten security
certifications. He was thus able to develop evaluation criteria for each characteristic in the model, rationale for
the criteria, and stakeholder relevance for each criterion. A revised evaluation model was produced
incorporating all findings.
In Phase Three the revised evaluation model was trialled by the first author – a senior IT Security Professional –
by applying the model (initially implemented as an Excel spreadsheet) to three IT security certification schemes.
The aim of the phase was to discover flaws in the model and identify improvements. Key findings from the first
three phases were provided in Tate et al (2007a, 2007b) and included further enhancements.
In Phase Four, the revised evaluation model (from Phase 3) was confirmed by a two hour focus group session
held at the Educause Australasia 2007 conference in Melbourne, Australia, in April 2007. The focus group
participants comprised seven IT security representatives from the IT industry, HE institutes and Australian
government agencies. The first two participants had been involved in implementing an internal IT security
certification scheme for a major international consultancy. They are a senior IT security professional, and a
senior IT security manager for the Asia-Pacific region. The third participant manages IT infrastructure, including
IT security, at a major Australian university. He has also participated in national IT security initiatives within the
university sector. The fourth and fifth participants are senior managers at different international IT vendors. One
has experience in IT security design and consultancy for a major systems vendor and was at the time a technical
manager. The other was employed at a major network vendor as a Systems Engineer, and is experienced in IT
security engineering and, in general, IT certification. The remaining two participants are in their twenties; they
have recent university study experience, one was completing a doctorate in information security management at
an Australian university; and the other was a recent graduate of an information systems undergraduate degree
(which included a final year information security unit), who had attended an Australian university as an
international student.
The session was moderated by a senior Australian academic in information security. The focus group session
debated significant issues relating to the revised evaluation model. Notes and the session transcript were
analysed for key themes using iterations of inductive qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000). Findings
confirmed the revised evaluation model (summarised in Table 1) and enabled development of a contextual
operational framework for offering the model (Figure 1 in the next section.). Further themes were grouped into
findings that are also reported in the next section, with fictitious company names employed to preserve
confidentiality.

FINDINGS
Support for IT security certification evaluation model
The evaluation model (summarised in Table 1) was strongly supported by all participants. First, the category of
“Credibility” was well supported. One participant suggested that the credibility of a security certification is
linked to the information security standard which the certification follows, but that such standards often lack
currency. Therefore if security standards are used as the exclusive basis for a security certification’s curriculum,
there is a strong likelihood that the certification’s content will lack currency. There was also agreement that the
assessment approach of a security certification plays a key part in its credibility:
“We have our own [IT security] certification… and even though it is vendor-specific, the assessment is
regarded as particularly tough … they really go out of their way to make life miserable for you in terms of
the toughness of the assessment.” [Systems Engineer, IT Network Vendor].
“But is that important?” [Moderator]
“Absolutely, it sorts out those that can, and those that can’t. I’ve known people that have done it [the
assessment] eight or nine times and failed it.” [Systems Engineer, IT Network Vendor].
This participant also noted that certification assessment methods must prevent cheating via rapid dissemination
of an exam over the internet. Without such a guarantee, a certification would have limited credibility.
When discussing the Curriculum Development characteristic (Table 1), participants noted the importance of
basing a certification on a publicly available recognised CBK, supporting recent arguments (Nance & Hay 2007;
Theoharidou & Grtiazalis 2007). A graduate noted the importance of wide-ranging coverage of any existing
CBK for an IT security certification:
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“As a graduate, I’d like to do a scheme that incorporates a vast knowledge of security more broadly, rather
than, for example, a vendor-based scheme, where it always feels as if you’re tying yourself down to that
product.” [Information security PhD Student, BigOzUni].
One participant expressed concern that a security certification’s curriculum often does not support employee
specialisation in future job roles. He cited the example of “business continuity” which is a softer security skill,
suggesting that it should be catered for in-depth by a security certification.
All participants agreed that Accessibility would be an important consideration when selecting a security
certification. They argued that IT security professionals should be able to undertake an exam without training.
Indeed, one graduate believed it a significant advantage to be able to access a certification exam without
undertaking training. The discussion in the focus group centred on whether a certification should mandate a
training course before allowing assessment. It emerged that some certifications require mandatory training from
the certification provider. Such a mandate could raise the suspicion that the providers are using the schemes to
generate income for training activities. Any mandated training, whether from the scheme provider or not, can
therefore be viewed as an access restriction.
However both graduate participants saw cost as the key characteristic for evaluating the accessibility of a
security certification. The international graduate commented that after paying hefty international student fees, it
was important to keep costs down in future studies. At the same time, he observed that in several years’ time,
after saving from paid work, he may be prepared to pay high fees to complete a security certification.
Regarding Relevance, participants agreed that a security certification should be relevant and that the
characteristics for relevance in the evaluation model are important. One vendor-employed participant was
concerned that the presence of vendor-neutrality in the evaluation model implied that vendor-specific
certifications were assumed inferior to vendor-neutral schemes. The participant’s concern suggests a need for
clarifying documentation to support the evaluation model. Interestingly, the two young graduates did not
understand why vendor-neutrality may be important to the relevance of a certification, again suggesting a need
for clarifying documentation. Some discussion took place on the differences between vendor-neutral and
vendor-specific schemes and, in particular, on the broader perspective and greater longevity offered by vendorneutral schemes. Participants expressed the view that such schemes were more like university courses whereas
vendor-specific schemes had more characteristics in common with training courses. Some participants believed
that IT security professionals should hold both types of certifications. Overall there was general support for the
vendor-neutral characteristic. Finally it was disappointing to learn that the two graduate participants were not
particularly concerned regarding whether a Code of Ethics was addressed by a certification scheme.
The value of the evaluation model was believed to be broader than its intended use for IT security certification
evaluation and selection. For example, one participant remarked:
“Personally, I find all of the information [offered by the evaluation model] extremely useful because on
top of what I’m doing, I’m also part of the ISACA Education and Training committee and that’s looking at
how we sell the cycle of certification to new members and what will attract them to come in and do that
certification..” [Security Professional, WorldITConsult].
Another participant suggested a further marketing use for the model:
“So being able to pull all this information together and give it to graduates or experienced [IT Security]
professionals and say ‘this certification has completed 90 percent of all of these criteria from an
independent study or independent framework’. You know that might encourage people, instead of saying,
‘well, you know, we really think that it’s important’”. [Security Professional, WorldITConsult].
Still another participant identified the model as an excellent new perspective on security certifications and
indicated that it would be useful to him personally.
“I feel empowered as a consumer of certification services in a way that I didn’t actually realise until we
had this exercise [the focus group]. I think really taking this [evaluation model] in and using this as a tool
for you to go out and help educate yourself - this is powerful stuff! And also for myself being a lifelong
learner, I’m going to use this. And I think this is a generally acceptable way of looking at certifications.”
[Information Security Manager, World IT Consult].
Implementation of Security Certification Evaluation as a Service
It was explained to focus group participants that input to the evaluation model when applied would comprise: 1)
objective data about each security certification (e.g. details about the governance of a security certification); and
2) subjective weightings reflecting stakeholder priorities. Participants suggested the possibility of streamlining
the process of comparing and assessing IT security certification schemes, by delegating the task of collecting the
data to a trusted entity which will undertake this collection once on behalf of all stakeholders. If potential users
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of the evaluation model can be persuaded to trust a hosted version, which has been pre-populated with objective
data from all the certification schemes, an individual user need only provide a set of weightings which reflects
their own circumstances and preferences.
Participants strongly agreed that the objective collection of data, population of the framework and hosting of the
online tool to support the framework should be undertaken by a trusted, independent body such as the CERT
bodies – in Australia, that is AusCERT:
“I wouldn’t want this to be held in an ISACA or ISC2 because I think then people won’t see the neutrality
of it. They might see it as just another way to sell a certification. I would like it be in a constant
independent body which is basically just educational. And I think that’s what AusCERT is.” [IT security
professional, WorldITConsult].
Other potentially valuable suggestions from participants have significant implications beyond the scope of the
research project. They will be the subject of future research and maintenance of the evaluation model, and
include:
• extending the evaluation model to record employer ratings of schemes;
• populating the evaluation model with data from all security certifications;
• producing a brochure to accompany the evaluation model; and
• extending the evaluation model to highlight salary levels for particular security certifications.
Individual users of all stakeholder groups enter preferences via
a web page and receive tailored comparisons between certifications
Novice
IT Security
Professional

Experienced
IT Security
Professional

Employer

HE Institute

Government

Web-Enabled IT Security Certification
Evaluation Model

DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONAL SERVICES
TO SUPPORT EVALUATION MODEL
Host the
Model

User Support
Services

Populate
the Model

Model
Development

Trusted Host Organisation (THO)
Trusted host organisation provides evaluation services
Figure 1: Framework for Stakeholder Evaluation of IT Security Certifications
A service-oriented Framework for Evaluating IT Security Certification Schemes (Figure 1) emerged from the
focus group findings and was subsequently developed in detail. According to this framework, a Trusted Hosting
Organisation (THO) will develop, maintain and offer a web-enabled application which implements the
evaluation model. The THO will host the evaluation model and enable access by individual users across the
internet. The THO will also provide support services such as published lists of Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs), application maintenance (bug fixing) and end-user help facilities.
In summary, it is anticipated that the Trusted Hosting Organisation (THO) would need to develop an application
to implement the evaluation model and provide four operational and development services to support the
application:
• hosting service to host the application;
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support services for application users;
data population service to keep the application up to date;
development service to undertake future development of the application.

DISCUSSION
A key finding is that THOs such as AusCERT - and other CERT agencies worldwide - could provide
certification evaluation and related services as shown in Figure 1. Key advantages of the service-oriented
framework (Figure 1) include allowing users to use the evaluation model without undertaking their own market
research. The THO would regularly research the security certification market and populate the application with
both general market data and data on currently available IT Security certification schemes. This pre-population
of the application means that all previously defined “objective” data for the model would be immediately
available for end-users. This has the dual benefit of facilitating a genuinely objective collection of data while
relieving each potential user of the burden of data collection. For the model to remain useful, however, it is
likely that the THO would need to undertake further development to address changes in market and user
expectations. It remains to be seen, of course, whether AusCERT could and would host the application and offer
related services. AusCERT and other CERTs are used to securely hosting a range of services so it is likely that
they would have the requisite capabilities.
A key disadvantage of the framework is its resourcing implications. For example, the cost of collecting the data
would be borne by the hosting organisation and is likely to be costly. For AusCERT to be willing to host the
framework may mean that some level of government funding is made available. Indeed, participants in the focus
group strongly believed that governments should support THOs in hosting the application and related services
by providing adequate resources, and that they should therefore be approached for sponsorship. Indeed the key
barrier identified to the implementation of the evaluation model was existing lack of support from governments.
One participant expressed surprise that the Australian government was not already undertaking this sort of
activity because it relied upon security certifications for assessing visa applications from IT security
professionals. Surprisingly, although the Australian Government commissioned a report on IT security
certifications from a consultancy (SIFT 2005), it concluded that no Australian certification was needed to satisfy
the national context, and did not recommend any mechanism for helping Australian IT security professionals
make choices between available international certifications. Since then, however, an APEC sponsored web site
has been established which enables comparisons between certifications based on curriculum coverage (SIFT
2008). Clearly the findings from this paper suggest that much more is needed and government support will be
sought accordingly.
Another key finding concerns the quality of education of IT security professionals. First, participants
emphasised that in Australia, employers are experiencing a shortage of knowledgeable skilled IT security
personnel. New graduates from HE institutes lack the right combination of breadth and depth of security
knowledge needed by IT security professionals working in specialised security roles. Furthermore, it was
mentioned in the focus group that HE institutes, by removing most if not all prerequisites from units, and
enrolling students with diverse backgrounds (some with work experience, others with none) in units, effectively
limit IT security graduate achievements in the workplace. To partly address this issue, HE institutes should aim
to ensure that IT security graduates achieve highly in their studies. Given the limitations of current HE program
models, complementary security certification and training are recommended for IT security graduates. However,
IT graduates planning to work as IT security professionals should be advised first to work in the IT security field
for several years before undertaking IT security certifications. This recommendation is important because IT
graduates are likely to find it challenging to select appropriate weightings for different security certification
characteristics without the background that only experience can provide. The recommendation to work for
several years post-graduation is further supported by the lack of awareness displayed by the two IT security
graduates in the focus group, with regard to important certification characteristics such as Governance and
Assessment.
The focus group findings further suggest that many IT security certifications lack a balance of breadth and depth
in their curriculum. First, it is not enough to only teach security technology as management issues and process
issues (eg business continuity) are increasingly valued in the workplace. The need for IT security professionals
to possess information security management skills is supported by recent evidence of strong demand for
business continuity certifications based on the new BS25999 standard (Ashford 2007). Second, vendor-specific
certification schemes traditionally lack breadth while vendor-neutral schemes frequently lack depth. The focus
group findings suggest that vendor-specific and vendor-neutral schemes could be combined in a complementary
way to provide both breadth and depth, although the cost of undertaking two courses may be prohibitive. Other
possibilities include designing new security certifications that allow for a general core and specialisation. The
need for breadth and depth in security certifications is clearly an issue for IT security certification developers
and HE institutes to address.
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Regarding security certification currency, IT security certification schemes require a level of risk-taking by IT
security professionals as it cannot be known in advance whether a particular certification has longevity. Each
certification should be governed by a body which ensures renewal to partly mitigate this risk. Yet many
certifications are unable to stay current due to slow-moving standards. This challenge for standards should be
investigated in future research.
The key access barrier to security certifications, as identified by the focus group, is cost. While evidence
supporting this conclusion was obtained from only two graduates, if this issue exists on a wider scale it will
contribute to the current shortage of IT security professionals. As mentioned above, there was support from the
focus group for the suggestion that IT graduates should aim to work in the field for several years before
undertaking an IT security certification scheme; such a strategy would provide savings toward certification fees.
Some employers also sponsor employees to undertake security certification, which will help alleviate cost
concerns; this practice should be encouraged by governments.
Nance and Hay (2007) have proposed the consolidation of current IT security certifications into one
international IT security certification. While the focus group did not suggest such a consolidation, which may
reduce the opportunities afforded by current certifications, there should be wider debate in relevant communities
about the future direction of IT security certifications in order to avoid continued proliferation and related
challenges in stakeholder evaluation and selection.

CONCLUSION
This paper has reported findings from a confirmatory focus group which was the final phase of a large research
project investigating an approach to evaluate and select an IT security certification scheme. Key theoretical
findings included an evaluation model (summarised in Table 1) and a service-oriented framework (Figure 1)
depicting the hosting of evaluation and related services by a trusted host organisation. The paper also provided
theoretical insights to add to existing theory on IT security certification, and practical recommendations for key
stakeholder groups (IT security professionals (novices and experienced), employers, governments, certification
developers and HE institutes). When implemented, the framework will contribute to improved IT security in
organisations. Additional benefits may be obtainable by applying the framework in conjunction with
complementary tools (e.g SIFT, 2008, which addresses the scope of a certification).
Key themes emerging from the paper are the need for 1) improvements in IT security certifications in terms of
currency of content and currency of standards which are slow moving due to lack of resources and competing
interests; 2) greater interest and support from governments; 3) improved IT security education at HE institutes;
and 4) a need for greater awareness by IT security graduates of the key issues surrounding and differentiating IT
security certifications. Once again, it is surprising that, given the general trend of developed societies to
increase consumer choice through improved access to information, there has been no evidence of any
government initiative to sustainably support IT security professionals in this direction. Finally, an overarching
theme emerging from the research is that IT security certification consumers of all kinds can be empowered by
the framework and evaluation model produced in the research project and discussed in this paper. Future
research should aim to extend the work carried out to date as suggested in the paper, with the intention of
providing greater consumer empowerment while improving information security in organisations globally.
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